Populists are elected everywhere. Nevertheless, it is striking that the inclination is significantly higher wherever there have been massive economic upheavals. This finding is among the best-researched. For example, economist David Autor showed in a famous study the influence of regional disruptions on the 2016 US presidential elections: Donald Trump ultimately won primarily in states that had struggled with deindustrialization. Autor’s analysis of US election votes showed that Republicans would have lost several states in the Rust Belt if the industries located there had not been so severely affected by increasing imports from low-wage countries¹.

Comparable findings emerge from studies by Thiemo Fetzer on Brexit. As the economist showed, in 2016, the vote for Brexit was particularly strong in traditional industrial locations, such as northeast England². The effect was particularly pronounced when the government had implemented particularly harsh cuts in those regions (see also the austerity factor). Cities like London or Cambridge, which were not affected by the decline, voted against Brexit³.

Düsseldorf economist Jens Südekum observed similar patterns for Germany, where regions can also be identified in which an above-average number of jobs have been lost due to economic upheavals⁴. These regions developed into strongholds of the AfD⁵. As Südekum and colleagues found, the AfD gained an above-average number of votes in traditional industrial regions with declining employment in manufacturing⁶. Such correlations were also observed in France, where the far-right Marine Le Pen also receives particularly high approval in the area known as the “French Rust Belt” – a region that had previously fallen into economic difficulties³.

Political implications

If the finding is correct, there is much to suggest that alternative industries should be preventively promoted in vulnerable regions when major upheavals are on the horizon. Empirical evidence for the effectiveness of such proactive regional policy is provided, among others, by Robert Gold for the EU. In a long-term evaluation of election data, the populism researcher shows that people in vulnerable regions, where the EU specifically invested in regional development, voted for fewer far-right parties in parliamentary elections⁷. Economists like Jens Südekum and Dani Rodrik also advocate such an approach⁸. In Saarland, a transformation fund was set up a few years ago with a view to the upcoming shift to electromobility, with which investments are to be mobilized and former employees in the automotive industry are to find new jobs.

Conclusions drawn from Autor’s diagnoses were also incorporated into the regional policy implemented by US President Joe Biden from 2021 to 2024. Keyword: Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). The funds were invested precisely in those regions that were considered particularly weakened – and where Donald Trump had previously been elected disproportionately.

Whether this policy was successful is rather doubtful given the Democrats’ defeat in 2024. As Robert Gold showed in a systematic regional evaluation of the 2024 US presidential elections, no noticeable effect of the massive regional investments on the corresponding regional voting behavior could be observed by the elections. However, experts cite the fact that the actual positive effects of the IRA were completely overshadowed by the inflation shock that occurred after the start of the war in Ukraine as a possible reason for the lack of a reaction. According to Gold’s hypothesis, there is also much to suggest that the effects will only occur with a delay. Whether and when a proactive regional policy is successful can therefore only be proven to a limited extent at present.

1 Autor, D., Dorn, D., Hanson, G., & Majlesi, K. (2017). A note on the effect of rising trade exposure on the 2016 presidential election. Appendix to Importing Political Polarization, 3139-3183.

2 Becker, S. O., Fetzer, T., & Novy, D. (2017). Who voted for Brexit? A comprehensive district-level analysis. Economic policy, 32(92), 601-650.

3 Rodríguez-Pose, A. (2018). The revenge of the places that don’t matter (and what to do about it). Cambridge journal of regions, economy and society, 11(1), 189-209.

4 Dauth, W., Findeisen, S., & Suedekum, J. (2014). The rise of the East and the Far East: German labor markets and trade integration. Journal of the European economic association, 12(6), 1643-1675.

5 Dippel, C., Gold, R., Heblich, S., & Pinto, R. (2022). The effect of trade on workers and voters, The Economic Journal, 132(641), 199-217.

6 Schneider, L. (2020). Deindustrialisierung und wahlverhalten. Wirtschaftsdienst, 100(10), 787-792.

7 Gold, R., & Lehr, J. (2024). Paying off populism: How regional policies affect voting behavior (No. 2266). Kiel Working Paper.

8 Rodrik, D. (2022). An industrial policy for good jobs. Hamilton Project—Policy proposal. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1-31.

If there is a large influx of people into Germany, more people vote for extreme parties. So it is said. In reality, a different correlation becomes much clearer upon closer inspection: approval for populists has risen sharply when inflation is high. For example, the AfD’s poll numbers in Germany rose precisely since the peak of inflation in autumn 2022. The same applies to 2026: here too, approval for the AfD increased precisely at the moment when oil prices and inflation rose as a result of the war in the Middle East.

Inflation seems to have had a similar effect in the USA. According to surveys, inflation was one of the most important issues for about 41 percent of US citizens in the 2024 election campaign¹. And: where the problem was perceived most strongly, Donald Trump tended to win the election. In other words: without inflation, Trump might not have become president a second time.

A majority of voters stated before the 2024 EU elections that reducing inflation was one of their core concerns². It seems logical that these preferences are also reflected in voting preferences. Indeed, an analysis of 13 European countries over a period of 30 years shows that voters punished incumbent governments at the ballot box when there were inflation surges during their term³.

Researchers Jonathan Federle, Cathrin Mohr, and Moritz Schularick examined the impact of inflation shocks by analyzing the results of 365 elections in 18 industrialized nations. Result: wherever unexpected major inflation shocks occur, populists win – with a price increase of 10 percentage points, the share of votes for populist parties increased by an average of about 15 percent. The gain for populist parties was particularly large when inflation shocks were not offset by higher wages and salaries: if real incomes fell, there were usually significantly more demonstrations and strikes in the country concerned⁴.

That inflation can have such a strong influence on voting behavior also seems to align with the findings of psychologists and sociologists: when prices rise, people experience a loss of control – to which many tend to react with a stronger inclination to vote for populists.

Political implications

If the finding is correct, the fight against inflation takes on a whole new meaning. And this also influences the choice of means. According to classical economic understanding, inflation should primarily be countered by raising key interest rates. The problem: the effect then only occurs with some delay – possibly too late to stop the inclination to vote for populist parties. Furthermore, classical key interest rate hikes can even be counterproductive, as they tend to promote inequality – which in turn benefits populists: wealthy households profit from higher returns with such interest rate hikes, while low-income households have to set aside more money for (loan) repayments.

Precisely because classical measures tend to be too late or counterproductive with regard to voting behavior, economists like Isabella Weber instead call for preventive measures. For example, in the event of a geopolitical shock, the speculative surge in raw material prices could be prevented by rapidly stocking up on supplies. In Germany, gas reserves were indeed replenished at the beginning of 2023 to keep energy prices low. Contrary to the market-liberal ideal of economists, given the massive political consequences, direct government interventions can also be sensible – for example, targeted price controls and price caps⁵.

1 Gillespie, L. (2024). Survey: 41% of Americans Say Inflation is Their Top Economic Issue for the 2024 Election. Retrieved October, 28, 2024.

2 Abnett, K. (2024). Economy, Migration, War top Voters’ Concerns in EU Election–Survey. Retrieved October, 28, 2024.

3 Chappell Jr, H. W., & Veiga, L. G. (2000). Economics and elections in Western Europe: 1960–1997. Electoral Studies, 19(2-3), 183-197.

4 Federle, J. J., Mohr, C., & Schularick, M. (2024). Inflation surprises and election outcomes (No. 2278). Kiel Working Paper.

5 Lara Jauregui, J., Weber, I. M., Pires, L. N., & Teixeira, L. (2025). Price Shocks are Redistribution Shocks: Systemically Significant Prices for Inequality in the United States. Isabella M. and Pires, Luiza Nassif and Teixeira, Lucas, Price Shocks are Redistribution Shocks: Systemically Significant Prices for Inequality in the United States.

Among the best-researched factors for people voting for populists are measures by which the state seeks to consolidate its finances – whether through cuts in social spending or higher taxes and duties. After pronounced austerity, populists regularly gain support. Numerous examples can be found for this, especially in Europe. A prominent example is Brexit, which was preceded by radical austerity measures by the British government between 2010 and 2015.

The economist Thiemo Fetzer shows in a great study that in those regions where these austerity measures were particularly strict, an above-average number of votes went to the populist UKIP party – by 3.5 to 11 percentage points more. This could have been decisive for Brexit. If the austerity measures had not been adopted, the referendum, according to Fetzer’s diagnosis, could well have turned out in favor of the “Remain” camp¹. Even individual austerity measures, such as the cut in housing benefit for low-income tenant families decided by the British government in 2011, led to demonstrably higher approval for “Leave,” according to Fetzer – and to many affected “Remain” supporters not casting a vote².

Similar effects are found for Sweden: In 2006, an austerity program was adopted here, which, among other things, significantly cut spending on health and unemployment benefits. The introduction of this austerity program led to a significant increase in the vote share of the far-right party “Swedish Democrats”³.

The effect of austerity can also be demonstrated at a pan-European level. An evaluation of 200 elections across European countries shows that a 1 percent cut in public spending leads to an increase in the vote share of extremist parties by about 3 percentage points⁴.

Political implications

If austerity measures increase the vote shares of populist and extremist parties, are targeted public expenditures, for example in economically disadvantaged regions, a means against populists? There are no clear results and answers to this yet.

Initial findings show that approval for populist parties actually decreases due to targeted EU investments. Among others, Giuseppe Albanese and co-authors prove that support for populists in Italian municipalities that received payments under an EU regional fund was 5 percent lower than in municipalities that received no payment⁵. Populism researcher Robert Gold also found that far-right parties gained less support in recent decades in those regions where the EU invested disproportionately through its structural funds.

On the other hand, the EU has recently launched large investment packages, including the “Next Generation EU” package announced in 2020, amounting to 750 billion euros, to cushion the economic consequences of the Corona crisis. However, this has not prevented populist parties from remaining on the rise in many regions during this period. Preliminary conclusion: further research seems necessary to understand under what circumstances such investments lead to declining approval for populists.

1 Fetzer, T. (2019). Did austerity cause Brexit?. American Economic Review, 109(11), 3849-3886.

2 Fetzer, T., Sen, S., & Souza, P. C. (2019). Housing insecurity, homelessness and populism: Evidence from the UK.

3 Bo, E. D., Finan, F., Folke, O., Persson, T., & Rickne, J. (2018). Economic losers and political winners: Sweden’s radical right. Unpublished manuscript, Department of Political Science, UC Berkeley, 2(5), 2.

4 Gabriel, R. D., Klein, M., & Pessoa, A. S. (2026). The political costs of austerity. Review of Economics and Statistics, 108(1), 145-161.

5 Albanese, G., Barone, G., & De Blasio, G. (2022). Populist voting and losers’ discontent: Does redistribution matter?. European Economic Review, 141, 104000.

Among the deeply underestimated underlying reasons for the rise of populists in all sorts of richer countries is something that can be categorized under the term China shocks. Almost everywhere where right-wing populists have won in the past ten years, there have previously been severe economic dislocations triggered by new competition from low-cost providers from emerging countries – primarily from China. For the USA, the term China shock was coined for this. Recently, a (second) China shock has also been discussed for Europe and Germany – meaning a phenomenon of drastically increasing imports from China coupled with simultaneously struggling (German) exports to China.

A whole series of studies now show that these shocks, through their economic and social effects, also influence voting behavior. Logically: here too, the feeling of a loss of control is directly or indirectly reinforced. What can be done against the sometimes heavily subsidized competition from afar?

Nobel laureate in economics Daron Acemoglu has shown that unemployment demonstrably rises more sharply in US regions where import tariffs for Chinese products were particularly low¹. Wages also fell in the affected regions². As David Autor demonstrated in his famous study, the consequences of the China shock from the early 2000s in the US contributed to an above-average number of people voting for Donald Trump in the affected Rust Belt regions in the 2016 elections.

Also legendary in this context is the book by current US Vice President J.D. Vance, who describes the regional consequences of decline on people in “Hillbilly Elegy.” In several European countries, the first “China shock” also directly affected the political attitudes of the population: In Great Britain, an increase in the Chinese import shock – by, statistically speaking, one standard deviation – led to a two percentage point increase in “Leave” votes during the Brexit vote³. In France, an increase in the Chinese import shock, in turn, led to a 0.4 percentage point higher share of votes for the far-right Front National⁴. In Germany, too, the shock significantly increased the AfD’s share of votes⁵.

Political implications

As with almost all empirically verifiable factors, the core issue with China shocks is that they reinforce the feeling of powerlessness and loss of control. Accordingly, all measures by which governments and the EU counter unfair competition from subsidized low-cost offers should be helpful. This could not only mitigate the consequences of the shocks but also give people in the affected countries the feeling that their own governments have not given up control and are indeed acting in the interest of their own population.

US President Donald Trump has clearly been aiming for this effect since 2025 by repeatedly threatening and implementing higher tariffs. The only question is whether this highly conflict-ridden policy, beyond the mere impression of supposed capability, also leads to an actual improvement in the economic situation – and thus permanently remedies the feeling of powerlessness. Especially since it always entails the risk of ongoing trade conflicts, i.e., the opposite of stability and control.

More effective could be targeted industrial policy measures that protect threatened regions early from the consequences of such shocks and create new perspectives. Significant parts of US President Joe Biden’s economic policy in the years leading up to 2024 also aimed at this. The Inflation Reduction Act was intended to direct investments specifically into weakened regions. This actually led to increased economic output and a record level of employment. However, as analyses by populism researcher Robert Gold show, the expected effect that voters would therefore vote less strongly for Donald Trump did not materialize at first.

In the long run, better managed globalization could help, where governments are allowed to pursue industrial policy, but this is covered by a new consensus on the rules for it – also to remedy the feeling of powerlessness and curb populists.

1 Acemoglu, D., Autor, D., Dorn, D., Hanson, G. H., & Price, B. (2016). Import competition and the great US employment sag of the 2000s. Journal of labor economics, 34(S1), S141-S198.

2 Autor, D. H., Dorn, D., & Hanson, G. H. (2013). The China syndrome: Local labor market effects of import competition in the United States. American economic review, 103(6), 2121-2168.

3 Colantone, I., & Stanig, P. (2018). Global competition and Brexit. American political science review, 112(2), 201-218.

4 Malgouyres, C. (2017). Trade shocks and far-right voting: Evidence from French presidential elections. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. RSCAS, 21.

5 Dippel, C., Gold, R., Heblich, S., & Pinto, R. (2017). Instrumental variables and causal mechanisms: Unpacking the effect of trade on workers and voters (No. w23209). National Bureau of Economic Research.

At first glance, the finding that financial crises and bank crashes lead to higher approval ratings for populists seems rather surprising. However, the great financial crisis of 2008, among other things, suggests exactly that.

The most prominent study on this comes from economists Manuel Funke, Moritz Schularick, and Christoph Trebesch. In an evaluation of financial crises over the past 140 years, they show that such crashes intensify social polarization. Far-right parties particularly benefit: on average, their vote shares increased by 30 percent after financial crises. Bank crises seem to intensify in a special way the discontent that leads people to vote for political extremes. “Classical” recessions or macroeconomic shocks that were not financial in nature did not trigger such an increase, according to the evaluations¹.

Yann Algan and co-authors came to similar conclusions in their study of the 2008 financial crisis. By evaluating data from 26 European countries, the researchers show that the crisis not only led to significantly more unemployment but also gave populist parties a significant boost. If unemployment rose by one percentage point due to the shock, this was accompanied by a gain in votes for anti-establishment parties of 2 to 4 percentage points².

The connection is explainable in any case: like some of the other important factors, bank crises also reinforce the feeling of a loss of control, which is already present in times of poorly managed globalization. For the narrative of populists, the fact that banks are rescued with a lot of money in such crises – while the “average citizen” bears the costs and unemployment – is also suitable.

In addition, indebted households are particularly burdened during bank crises. Populists exploit this too. In Hungary, populist parties advocated debt-friendly policies and against “the elite,” “the bankers,” and “international financial capitalism” after the 2008 financial crisis – a strategy with which they recorded a significant increase in votes³.

Political implications

Avoiding bank crises is always good – whether for economic, social, or political reasons: to avoid having to deal with strengthening populists as a late consequence. Against this background, economists call for both preventive and reactive measures. Moritz Schularick and Yann Algan therefore fundamentally advocate long-term investments in research, innovation, and public infrastructure to promote economic stability. If bank crises nevertheless occur, (Europe-wide) counter-cyclical fiscal policy measures and targeted support for less-skilled workers are needed to prevent the success of populists. Another electoral policy consequence could be to ensure much more strongly when rescuing banks that non-bankers are also protected from the consequences of such a crisis.

1 Funke, M., Schularick, M., & Trebesch, C. (2016). Going to extremes: Politics after financial crises, 1870–2014. European Economic Review, 88, 227-260.

2 Algan, Y., Guriev, S., Papaioannou, E., & Passari, E. (2017). The European trust crisis and the rise of populism. Brookings papers on economic activity, 2017(2), 309-400.

3 Gyöngyösi, G., & Verner, E. (2022). Financial crisis, creditor‐debtor conflict, and populism. The Journal of Finance, 77(4), 2471-2523.

People vote for the AfD in rich regions as well as in poorer ones. This is often said to argue that voting behavior has nothing to do with economic and social inequality. In reality, studies show that there is a clear correlation. While populists are indeed not only elected in poorer regions, the absolute gap between income or wealth also does not seem to be decisive. However, an exacerbation of inequality certainly leads to more people voting for populists.

An analysis of EU data shows that the share of votes for far-right parties increased by an average of 4.8 percentage points when the incomes of the top ten percent of earners had previously risen significantly – by, statistically speaking, one standard deviation¹. These results were confirmed in studies of OECD countries: here too, growing income inequality is regularly followed by higher approval for far-right parties. However, actual monetary differences between incomes are not the driving motive behind this effect.

Election analyses repeatedly confirm that approval for right-wing populist parties among workers is now drastically higher than among the general population. This suggests that social conditions definitely play a role.

However, in-depth investigations into the motives show that higher income inequality primarily reinforces the vote for populists by driving the fear of social decline². This also confirms the finding that, individually, the fear of loss of control and powerlessness significantly contributes to many people opting for populists and their rhetoric of regaining control – “take back control,” as it successfully served as a slogan for the Brexit campaign. Another effect confirmed in studies: income inequality reduces trust in political elites – and leads to a stronger emphasis on national pride¹.

Political implications

What measures are suitable to curb this effect? One immediate option seems to be redistribution measures, such as a progressive consumption tax² or higher taxes on high incomes and wealth. However, if inequality primarily affects voting behavior through the reinforced fear of status loss and decline, such tax policy measures alone are unlikely to achieve much. Even higher taxation of upper incomes would not per se change the fears of those who fear their own decline. Then, it is much more about all those measures that could help to remedy the feeling of powerlessness.

This could be achieved, for example, by actively creating new perspectives for supposedly marginalized population groups. Among the more modern policies that could also curb populism is therefore a proactive regional policy that attracts new industries early on when upheavals are imminent and thus actively helps employees find new jobs. This also fundamentally includes a more active industrial policy that attempts to cushion the consequences of technology and globalization shocks that would otherwise result from pure market forces – and drive people into the arms of populists out of frustration³.

1 Pástor, Ľ., & Veronesi, P. (2021). Inequality aversion, populism, and the backlash against globalization. The Journal of Finance, 76(6), 2857-2906.

2 Engler, S., & Weisstanner, D. (2021). The threat of social decline: income inequality and radical right support. Journal of European Public Policy, 28(2), 153-173.

3 Gold, R. (2022, February). From a better understanding of the drivers of populism to a new political agenda. In Forum for a New Economy, WP (No. 4).

A growing body of empirical research suggests that manipulation and tone in social media primarily benefit populists. This applies not only to Donald Trump or Elon Musk, who actively use these media for their own purposes. However, this effect primarily reflects how populists use amplification mechanisms – and gain voters or sympathizers through demagoguery in relevant channels. Whether social media per se can be classified as an original cause of the populism wave of recent years is less clear.

A prominent meta-study by Ekaterina Zhuravskaya and co-authors shows that social media, compared to other communication technologies, possesses various characteristics that promote populism. Firstly, populist arguments against “the establishment” appear more credible on online platforms than in other media. Secondly, social media creates its own bubbles through its algorithms, which confirm users’ political attitudes and strengthen the “us-versus-them feeling”¹.

Furthermore, a lack of regulations facilitates the spread of fake news, from which populists particularly benefit: During the 2016 US presidential election, 30 million fake news stories were shared that portrayed Donald Trump positively, while Hillary Clinton was portrayed positively in 8 million fake news stories².

The widespread use of social media therefore has direct political implications. In Italy, for example, expanded internet access after 2008 demonstrably led to higher approval for the populist 5-Star Movement³. The renowned populism researcher Sergei Guriev confirms this correlation in an analysis of data from 33 European democracies between 2007 and 2018. According to this, the spread of 3G internet access increased the share of votes for right-wing populist parties by 4.6 percentage points during this period⁴.

Much also suggests that the proliferation of media per se tends to reinforce rather than reduce the perceived loss of control.

Political implications

Contrary to public perception, fake news is still largely spread by people. Therefore, technical solutions are likely to be insufficient to limit the success of populist parties on social media. Instead, verified information must be clearly labeled, and incentives must be created to deter the spread of fake news⁵. A contribution to reducing populist reflexes could be to oblige social platforms to introduce comprehensive controls of posted content².

Fundamentally, solutions to the problem could also arise from a new understanding of technology policy, as suggested by Nobel laureate Daron Acemoglu – where the direction of innovation is less left to market forces and corporations and more socially and democratically determined than before.

1 Zhuravskaya, E., Petrova, M., & Enikolopov, R. (2020). Political effects of the internet and social media. Annual review of economics, 12(1), 415-438.

2 Allcott, H., & Gentzkow, M. (2017). Social media and fake news in the 2016 election. Journal of economic perspectives, 31(2), 211-236.

3 Campante, F., Durante, R., & Sobbrio, F. (2018). Politics 2.0: The multifaceted effect of broadband internet on political participation. Journal of the European Economic Association, 16(4), 1094-1136.

4 Guriev, S., Melnikov, N., & Zhuravskaya, E. (2021). 3g internet and confidence in government. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 136(4), 2533-2613.

5 Vosoughi, S., Roy, D., & Aral, S. (2018). The spread of true and false news online. science, 359(6380), 1146-1151.

If fears of losing control contribute to people voting for grandstanding populists, then it is highly likely that this is also the case when it comes to fears of new technologies – especially recently, those triggered by artificial intelligence and corresponding fears of losing human autonomy.

Added to this is an old concern: that new technologies also bring increasing unemployment – which is controversial, as new technologies always create new potentials. However, Nobel laureate in economics Daron Acemoglu impressively showed in a much-noticed 2017 study that the use of industrial robots demonstrably increased the unemployment rate in the US¹.

Since then, evidence has accumulated that technologization and automation also promote populism. For example, increasing automation had a demonstrable effect on the 2016 US presidential elections. Carl Frey, Thor Berger, and Chinchih Chen show that states whose economic output was more automated than elsewhere in the US voted disproportionately for Donald Trump. According to statistical analyses, Republicans would have lost US states like Wisconsin, Michigan, or Pennsylvania – and thus the election – if automation in these states had been 25 percent lower².

Similar effects are found in Europe. In a long-term analysis for Western European countries, economists Massimo Anelli, Italo Colantone, and Piero Stanig show that individuals who are more exposed to automation tend to vote for nationalist and far-right parties³. Automation primarily induces individuals living under economically precarious conditions to vote for far-right parties⁴.

Artificial intelligence could be a special case here. The effects of the rapid spread of artificial intelligence on the labor market are still insufficiently researched. However, economist Armin Granulo shows that the majority of Europeans already classify AI as a threat to jobs. This perception, regardless of the actual effects, has political implications: The evaluation of two representative experiments shows that classifying AI as a threat to jobs is associated with a dwindling trust in democratic institutions⁵.

Nobel laureate in economics Daron Acemoglu puts forward the thesis in a new paper that the increasing use of AI increases the likelihood of state repression. Increasing automation increases inequality, which in turn increases public discontent and the likelihood of social resistance. To counter this, governments could either use state redistribution or repression measures⁶. Such state reactions to automation and AI would then give populists further momentum.

Political implications

If new technologies particularly negatively affect certain population groups – such as those with lower qualifications – it would be obvious to address the corresponding discontent through financial redistribution. However, a positive effect of redistribution on voting behavior has so far only been conditionally proven empirically. One possible reason is that increasing automation not only threatens jobs but also the associated social status of individuals – a loss that is difficult to compensate for with compensatory payments alone⁷.

If this diagnosis is correct, political responses must aim to protect the losers of increasing automation and AI not only reactively but also preventively. Fundamentally, economists like Acemoglu have long argued that technological change should be left much less to pure market forces. Historically, there are numerous examples that major technological innovations do not arise spontaneously in the economy but are the result of state policy, often militarily motivated in history. A new technology policy could therefore much more strongly direct and socially co-determine which technology is accepted and desired (directed technology). Ultimately, such a fundamental change in principles could then also be a means against the perceived loss of control – and counteract the widespread feeling that people are helplessly exposed to technological shocks.

1 Acemoglu, D., & Restrepo, P. (2020). Robots and jobs: Evidence from US labor markets. Journal of political economy, 128(6), 2188-2244.

2 Frey, C. B., Berger, T., & Chen, C. (2018). Political machinery: did robots swing the 2016 US presidential election?. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 34(3), 418-442.

3 Anelli, M., Colantone, I., & Stanig, P. (2019). We were the robots: Automation and voting behavior in western europe (No. 17/19). CReAM Discussion Paper Series.

4 Im, Z. J., Mayer, N., Palier, B., & Rovny, J. (2019). The “losers of automation”: A reservoir of votes for the radical right?. Research & Politics, 6(1), 2053168018822395.

5 Granulo, A., Raff, A., & Fuchs, C. (2026). Perceiving AI as labor-replacing reduces democratic legitimacy and political engagement. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 123(4), e2523508123.

6 Acemoglu, D., Gitmez, A. A., & Shadmehr, M. (2026). Automation and Repression (No. w35336). National Bureau of Economic Research.

7 Gingrich, J. (2019). Did state responses to automation matter for voters?. Research & Politics, 6(1), 2053168019832745.

In the Berlin political bubble, it was long believed that the refugee crisis of 2015 first led to the rise of the AfD. However, there was never truly robust evidence for this – especially since right-wing populists have gained even stronger support in many other countries since then, even though there was no “2015” there. The disillusionment was accordingly great when the AfD continued to gain approval in 2026 despite significantly stricter asylum laws and declining immigration.

This does not mean that migration cannot also contribute to a perceived sense of powerlessness and loss of control. However, the connection between migration and the increase in votes for populist and far-right parties does not seem to be as clear-cut, according to the extensive research now available.

On the one hand, there is evidence of a positive correlation. Economists Guglielmo Barone and Martin Halla show that far-right parties like Forza Italia or the FPÖ were able to gain more votes when communities were exposed to more migration^1,2. Thiemo Fetzer found empirical evidence that increasing migration raised the share of votes for the UKIP party in Great Britain³.

On the other hand, there is also plenty of evidence for a negative correlation: researchers Andreas Steinmayr, Paul Vertier, and Max Viskanic showed that higher immigration even reduced the share of votes for populist Austrian and French parties^4,5. Lonsky specifies this effect for Finland: A one percent increase in migrants was associated with a 3.4 percentage point reduction in populist votes there⁶.

The contradictory nature of these studies shows that the relationship between migration and populism is complex and depends on various factors. The number of migrants, their qualifications, or whether they are merely passing through or staying long-term – all these variables seem to influence whether populists benefit from migration⁷. It is also striking that, for example, in Germany, right-wing populists receive above-average votes in regions where the proportion of migrants in the population is rather low – and conversely, rather low where there has been much migration in the past. If there were a direct correlation, it would also be difficult to explain why approval for the right continues to increase despite declining immigration. This at least suggests that there are other, possibly stronger, influencing factors.

Political implications

The ambiguous effect of migration on voting decisions in favor of populist forces complicates political recommendations. Closer investigations, for example, into the often-highlighted more restrictive migration policy in Denmark, show that while this imitation of right-wing policies contributed to short-term electoral successes for social democrats against right-wing populists, the total share of votes for right-wing nationalist and far-right parties in Denmark has not decreased since then.

It is likely exacerbated by the fact that people systematically overestimate the extent of migration. In the US, the proportion of migrants was estimated at 35 percent in surveys – in fact, it was only 10 percent. Other factors, such as the educational level of migrants, are also continuously misjudged: In a 2019 survey, Britons estimated that only about 25 percent of migrants had a university degree – in reality, it was 50 percent⁸.

The British economist Paul Collier recommended in 2025 a proactive migration policy that consciously addresses the concerns of the local population – for example, through targeted investments and financial flows into regions that have experienced particularly strong migration.

At the same time, the populist narrative of alienation is likely to unfold its own effect – regardless of actual impacts. Accordingly, counter-narratives that focus on dismantling deliberately stirred fears – without downplaying legitimate concerns – are likely to be important.

1 Barone, G., D’Ignazio, A., De Blasio, G., & Naticchioni, P. (2016). Mr. Rossi, Mr. Hu and politics. The role of immigration in shaping natives’ voting behavior. Journal of Public Economics, 136, 1-13.

2 Halla, M., Wagner, A. F., & Zweimüller, J. (2012). Does immigration into their neighborhoods incline voters toward the extreme right? The case of the Freedom Party of Austria.

3 Becker, S. O., & Fetzer, T. (2016). Does migration cause extreme voting. Center for Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy and The Economic & Social Research Council, 1-54.

4 Steinmayr, A. (2021). Contact versus exposure: Refugee presence and voting for the far right. Review of Economics and Statistics, 103(2), 310-327.

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